At this week’s Bled Strategic Forum, European Council President Charles Michel propose the year 2030 as the target by which EU Member States and candidate countries should be ready for enlargement. Although the speech showed that this policy now occupies a more important place on the Union’s agenda, the question of whether there will actually be new EU members in the next seven years remains open, as the Union and the candidates make slow progress toward meeting each other. the necessary conditions.
EU officials have been reluctant to propose a specific date for future enlargement, since the previous European Commission published a strategy pointing to 2025 as a potential year for admitting new members. The EU was careful not to engage too strongly this year and was then quietly abandoned.
Michel’s proposal therefore comes after years of ambiguity regarding the state of preparation and timetable for enlargement. It comes against the backdrop of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, which is already in its early stages. produces predictions that the acceptance of new members will return to the agenda due to geopolitical considerations. Shortly after, Ukraine and Moldova became official candidate countries, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Loïc Trégoures, lecturer at the Catholic Institute of Paris, confirms for European Western Balkans that enlargement is now, by necessity, among the priorities of the European agenda. No one would have imagined that Ukraine, Moldova and, potentially, Georgia would become candidate countries in 2021, he says.
“It is Michel’s duty to send a political signal, to give an impulse and a horizon with a date, even if giving a date implies a high risk of disappointment if nothing is done. So I think the door is really open,” he says.
Wouter Zweersresearcher at Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, recognizes that enlargement is high on the EU agenda, stressing that it will be “everywhere” in the coming months.
“There is the informal Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers, the informal European Council in Grenada, the October European Council and the December European Council, as well as the EU-Western Balkans summit coming up. In all these events, the enlargement and institutional reform of the EU will be decisive. take center stage. The discussions will focus both on short-term decisions, such as whether or not to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, but even more on the necessary reforms in the enlargement process and in the EU herself,” recalls Zweers for ISF.
It remains clear, however, that the EU has still not reached a consensus on enlargement by 2030. In the days following Michel’s speech, mixed reactions could be heard in public opinion.
On the one hand, it seems that France, which only a few years ago was considered the main skeptic of enlargement within the EU, has started to change its position and tone. Laurence Boone, French Minister of State for Europe, also participating in the Bled Strategic Forum, declared on Tuesday that “there will be no security and stability in the EU and neighboring countries without enlargement “. She even added that EU enlargement could happen sooner than 2030, provided that the EU and the candidate countries reform themselves. Other EU leaders, including the host government of Slovenia, have also expressed support for the process.
On the other hand, several events after the Bled speech have raised the question of whether there is clear agreement and coordination on this issue. A day later, a European Commission spokesperson said the institution was not focused on a date but on working with candidate countries to meet the necessary conditions. Some Western Balkans leaders, including Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić, have expressed their own skepticism that enlargement will be achieved by 2030.
Another elephant in the room remains the desire of candidates to become EU member states. The pace of reform has been slow at best, with some countries even regressing in several areas. A lasting solution to the Western Balkans’ most important bilateral dispute, between Kosovo and Serbia, still seems out of reach.
Loïc Tregoures believes that, realistically, Montenegro and North Macedonia can hope to move closer to the 2030 target, if the “regatta principle” is retained – with countries becoming members individually once they meet the criteria required. He also affirms that France’s position has seriously evolved.
“The position has been very clear for 18 months: there is a new situation, the enlargement of Europe is a geopolitical priority, reluctance on this principle has disappeared among the French authorities. However, admission conditions will not be sacrificed,” says Trégoures.
Wouter Zweers believes that Michel was bold in setting 2030 as a target date.
“This could surely be possible, but several conditions must be met. On the EU side, this will depend on the political will and ability of leaders to put aside differences and resolve internal EU reforms. There is certainly momentum and ideas about models such as progressive integration, which have been around for some time now, are becoming more concrete and transformed into policies. This should make the accession process more tangible and could incentivize candidates to encourage reforms. But it is quite ambitious to think that all candidates will be able to join by 2030,” he says.
The Netherlands, alongside France, is also one of the EU member states seen as most skeptical of enlargement in recent years. According to Zweers, for this country the geopolitical need for rapid EU enlargement is not as important as safeguarding the internal functioning of the EU.
“I expect the Netherlands to be constructive in discussions on internal EU reforms and on reforming the enlargement process, because these discussions offer the opportunity to improve the functioning of the EU as a whole, for example its decision-making procedures. But the Netherlands will not accept the rapid accession of a candidate if the conditions in terms of rule of law and geopolitical alignment, therefore adherence to EU sanctions and foreign policy positions, are not sufficiently fulfilled,” concludes Zweers.
